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Recent investigations have uncovered large, 
consistent deviations from the predictions of the 
textbook representation of Homo economicus 
(Alvin E. Roth et ai., 1991; Ernst Fehr and 
Simon Gachter, 2000; Colin Camerer, 2001). 
One problem appears to lie in economists' ca-
nonical assumption that individuals are entirely 
self-interested: in addition to their own material 
payoffs, many experimental subjects appear to 
care about fairness and reciprocity, are willing 
to change the distribution of material outcomes 
at personal cost, and are willing to reward those 
who act in a cooperative manner while punish-
ing those who do not even when these actions 
are costly to the individual. These deviations 
from what we will term the canonical model 
have important consequences for a wide range 
of economic phenomena, including the optimal 
design of institutions and contracts, the alloca-
tion of property rights, the conditions for suc-
cessful collective action, the analysis of 
incomplete contracts, and the persistence of 
noncompetitive wage premia. 
Fundamental questions remain unanswered. 
Are the deviations from the canonical model 
evidence of universal patterns of behavior, or do 
the individual's economic and social environ-
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ments shape behavior? If the latter, which eco-
nomic and social conditions are involved? Is 
reciprocal behavior better explained statistically 
by individuals' attributes such as their sex, age, 
or relative wealth, or by the attributes of the 
group to which the individuals belong? Are 
there cultures that approximate the canonical 
account of self-regarding behavior? 
Existing research cannot answer such ques-
tions because virtually all subjects have been 
university students, and while there are cultural 
differences among student populations through-
out the world, these differences are small com-
pared to the range of all social and cultural 
environments. To address the above questions, 
we and our collaborators undertook a large 
cross-cultural study of behavior in ultimatum, 
public good, and dictator games. Twelve expe-
rienced field researchers, working in 12 coun-
tries on five continents, recruited subjects from 
15 small-scale societies exhibiting a wide vari-
ety of economic and cultural conditions. Our 
sample consists of three foraging societies, six 
that practice slash-and-burn horticulture, four 
nomadic herding groups, and three sedentary, 
small-scale agriculturalist societies. Our results 
are described in detail, with extensive ethno-
graphic accounts of the cultures we studied and 
citations to the relevant literature, in Henrich et 
al. (2001); an extended overview paper is avail-
able online. 1 
We can summarize our results as follows. 
First, the canonical model is not supported in 
any society studied. Second, there is consider-
ably more behavioral variability across groups 
than had been found in previous cross-cultural 
research, and the canonical model fails in a 
wider variety of ways than in previous experi-
ments. Third, group-level differences in eco-
nomic organization and the degree of market 
I URL: (www.santafe.edu) 
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integration explain a substantial portion of the 
behavioral variation across societies: the higher 
the degree of market integration and the higher 
the payoffs to cooperation, the greater the level 
of cooperation in experimental games. Fourth, 
individual-level economic and demographic 
variables do not explain behavior either within 
or across groups. Fifth, behavior in the experi-
ments is generally consistent with economic 
patterns of everyday life in these societies. 
I. The Evidence 
Because the ultimatum game (UG) has been 
conducted throughout the world with student 
populations and has generated robust violations 
of the canonical model, we conducted this game 
in all of our 17 societies. The "proposer" in this 
game is provisionally assigned an amount 
equivalent to a day or two's wages in the society 
and asked to propose an offer to a second per-
son, the "respondent." The respondent may then 
either accept the offer, in which case the two 
players receive the proposed amounts, or reject 
it, in which case the two receive nothing. If both 
players conform to the canonical model and if 
this is common knowledge, it is easy to see that 
the proposer will know that the respondent will 
accept any positive offer and so will offer the 
smallest possible amount, which will be 
accepted. 
In most of our field experiments subjects 
played anonymously, not knowing the identity 
of the person or persons with whom they were 
paired. The stakes of most games were denom-
inated in money (though in some cases tobacco 
or other goods were used). In all cases, we 
tested prospective participants for their compre-
hension of the experiment and eliminated any 
who appeared not to grasp the game. 
The systematic deviations from the canonical 
model in our sample of simple societies can be 
inferred from Table 1, which lists all groups 
where UG's were conducted. Contrary to the 
prediction of the standard model, even the 
groups with the smallest offers have mean of-
fers greater than 25 percent of stake size. Illus-
trating our second result (the large variation in 
mean offers across societies), others, including 
the Torguud and the Mapuche, offered between 
30 percent and 40 percent, while still others, 
including the Achuar and the Sangu, offered 




Mean Rejection rejection 
Group Country offer" Modes· rateC rated 
Machiguenga Peru 0.26 0.15/0.25 0.048 0.10 
(72) (1/21) (1/10) 
Hadza Tanzania DAD 0.50 0.19 0.80 
(big camp) (28) (5126) (4/5) 
Hadza Tanzania 0.27 0.20 0.28 0.31 
(small (38) (8/29) (5116) 
camp) 
Tsimane Bolivia 0.37 0.5/0.3/0.25 0.00 0.00 
(65) (OnO) (0/5) 
Quichua Ecuador 0.27 0.25 0.15 0.50 
(47) (2113) (112) 
Torguud Mongolia 0.35 0.25 0.05 0.00 
(30) (1120) (0/1) 
Khazax Mongolia 0.36 0.25 
Mapuche Chile 0.34 0.50/0.33 0.067 0.2 
(46) (2130) (2110) 
Au PNG 0.43 0.3 0.27 1.00 
(33) (8/30) (1/1) 
Gnau PNG 0.38 0.4 0.4 0.50 
(32) (10/25) (316) 
Sangu Tanzania 0.41 0.50 0.25 1.00 
farmers (35) (5/20) ( III) 
Sangu Tanzania 0.42 0.50 0.05 1.00 
herders (40) (1/20) (III ) 
Unresettled Zimbabwe 0041 0.50 0.1 0.33 
villagers (56) (3/31) (215) 
Resettled Zimbabwe 0.45 0.50 0.07 0.57 
villagers (70) (12186) (4n) 
Achuar Ecuador 0.42 0.50 0.00 0.00 
(36) (0116) (011) 
Orrtta Kenya 0.44 0.50 0.04 0.00 
(54) (2156) (0/0) 
Ache! Paraguay 051 0.50/0.40 0.00 0.00 
(75) (0/51) (0/8) 
Lamelara' Indonesia 0.58 0.50 0.00 0.00 
(63) (3/8) (4120) 
Note: PNG = Papua New Guinea. 
• This column shows the mean offer (as a proportion) in the ultimatum 
game for each society. 
• This column shows the modal offer(s), with the percentage of 
subjects who make modal offers (in parentheses). 
eThe rejection rate (as a proportion), with the actual numbers given in 
parentheses. 
d The rejection rate for offers of 20 percent or less, with the actual 
numbers given in parentheses. 
, Includes experimenter-generated low offers. 
between 40 percent and 50 percent. Finally, the 
Ache and the Lamelara had mean offers greater 
than 50 percent. 
These group differences are strikingly large 
compared to previous cross-cultural work com-
paring ultimatum-game behavior among univer-
sity students (Roth et aI., 1991). While mean 
offers in industrial societies are typically close 
to 44 percent, the mean offers in our sample 
range from 26 percent to 58 percent. Similarly, 
while modal offers are consistently 50 percent 
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in industrialized societies, our sample modes 
vary from 15 percent to 50 percent. 
As shown in the last two columns of Table 
1, rejections are also much more variable than 
previously observed. While in industrial socie-
ties offers below 20 percent are rejected with 
probability 0.40 to 0.60, rejections of low offers 
are extremely rare among some groups. In other 
groups, however, we observe substantial rejec-
tions rates, including frequent rejections of of-
fers above 50 percent. Among the Achuar, Ache 
and Tsimane, we observe zero rejections after 
16, 51, and 70 proposer offers, respectively. 
Moreover, while the Ache and Achuar made 
fairly equitable offers, nearly 50 percent of Tsi-
mane offers were at or below 30 percent, yet all 
were accepted. Similarly, Machiguenga re-
sponders rejected only one offer, despite the 
fact that over 75 percent of their offers were 
below 30 percent. At the other end of the rejec-
tion scale, Hadza responders rejected 24 percent 
of all proposer offers and 43 percent of offers at 
20 percent and below. Unlike the Hadza, who 
preferentially rejected low offers, the Au and 
Gnau of Papua New Guinea rejected both unfair 
and hyper-fair (greater than 50 percent) offers 
with nearly equal frequency. 
In experiments with university subjects, 
offers are generally consistent with income-
maximization, given the distribution of rejec-
tions. In our sample, however, in the majority 
of groups the modal behavior of the propos-
ers is not consistent with expected income-
maximization. In the Tsimane and Ache cases, 
for instance, there are no rejections of offers 
below 20 percent, although there were several 
low offers. The rejection rate for all other 
offers is also zero. Yet the modal offer in both 
groups is 50 percent, and the average offers 
are 37 percent and 51 percent, respectively. 
Where possible, we used the relationship 
between the size of the offer and the frac-
tion of rejections to estimate income-maxi-
mizing offers for the group in question. In one 
group, the Hadza proposers approximated the 
income-maximizing offer quite closely, thus 
confirming the canonical model; but Hadza 
responders frequently rejected substantial 
positi ve offers, thus violating the canonical 
model. In all other groups, average offers 
exceeded the income-maximizing offer, in 
most cases by a substantial amount. 
Data from public-goods games played in 
seven of these societies also show much greater 
variation than previously found, and again they 
exhibit novel deviations from the predictions of 
the canonical model. Public-goods games ask 
subjects to contribute to a common pool that 
will be expanded by the experimenter and then 
redistributed to all subjects. The canonical 
prediction is that everyone will free-ride, con-
tributing nothing. Typical distributions of public-
goods game contributions with students have a 
U-shape, with the mode at contributing nothing, 
a secondary mode at full cooperation, and mean 
contribution between 40 percent and 60 percent. 
By contrast, for instance, the Machiguenga have 
a mode at contributing nothing, with not a sin-
gle subject cooperating fully, yielding a mean 
contribution of 22 percent. Also, the Ache and 
Tsimane both exhibit inverted distributions, 
with few or no contributions at full free-riding 
or full cooperation. 
In three dictator games played in three of 
these societies, groups also deviate both from 
typical behavior in industrialized societies and 
the canonical predictions. The dictator game 
allows the proposer simply to assign some frac-
tion of the stake to a passive second party who 
receives that amount. Among university stu-
dents, the distribution of "offers" in the dictator 
game typically has a mode at zero and a sec-
ondary mode at 50/50, while the canonical 
model predicts that people will give zero. Con-
trasting with both, the Orma have a mode at 50 
percent and a secondary mode at 20 percent. 
Hadza dictators show a mode at 10 percent. 
Offers of 0 percent and 50 percent are also 
popular. Among the Tsimane, there were no 
zero offers; the mean was 32 percent, and the 
mode was 25 percent. 
II. What Explains Group-Level Differences? 
The large variations across the different 
cultural groups suggest that preferences or ex-
pectations are affected by group-specific condi-
tions, such as social institutions or cultural 
fairness norms. The large variance in institu-
tions and norms in our sample allowed us to 
address this question systematically. Because of 
space limits we here concentrate on the behav-
ior of proposers in the UG. We rank-ordered the 
societies along two dimensions: 
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(i) Payoffs to cooperation (PC).-How impor-
tant and how large is a group's payoff from 
cooperation in economic production? 
(ii) Market integration (Ml}.-How much do 
people rely on market exchange in their 
daily lives? 
On the first dimension, payoffs to coopera-
tion, the Machiguenga and Tsimane rank the 
lowest; they are almost entirely economically 
independent at the family level and engage 
rarely in productive activities involving more 
than members of a family. By contrast, the 
Lamelara whale-hunters go to sea in large ca-
noes manned by a dozen or more individuals. 
The rationale for PC as a predictor of UG offers 
is that with little cooperative production there 
will be little necessity to share returns, while 
those whose livelihood depends on large-scale 
cooperation like the Lamelara must develop 
ways of sharing the joint surplus. Thus we 
might expect that a higher level of PC will 
increase sharing behavior in the UG. The ratio-
nale for market integration as an explanatory 
variable is that the more frequently people ex-
perience market transactions, the more they will 
also experience abstract sharing principles con-
cerning behaviors toward strangers of which the 
UG is an example. 
We sought to explain group mean UG offers 
on the basis of these two dimensions of eco-
nomic structure. In a regression, both PC and 
MI were highly significant, their (positive) nor-
malized regression coefficients were large in 
magnitude (about 0.3), and the two measures 
jointly explained 68 percent of the variance. 
The impact of PC and MI remains large and 
robust in an equation predicting individual of-
fers, including individual measures such as sex, 
age, relative wealth, village population size, 
stake size, and experimenter experience with the 
group. Surprisingly, none of these individual level 
measures was significantly related to offers. 
A plausible interpretation of our subjects' 
behaviors is that, when faced with a novel sit-
uation (the experiment), they looked for ana-
logues in their daily experience, asking "What 
familiar situation is this game like?" and then 
acted in a way appropriate for the analogous 
situation. For instance, the hyper-fair UG offers 
(greater than 50 percent) and the frequent rejec-
tions of these offers among the Au and Gnau 
reflect the culture of gift-giving found in these 
societies. Among these groups, like many in 
New Guinea, accepting gifts, even unsolicited 
ones, commits one to reciprocate at some future 
time to be determined by the giver. Receipt of 
large gifts also establishes one in a subordinate 
position. Consequently, excessively large gifts, 
especially unsolicited ones, will frequently be 
refused because of the anxiety about the unspe-
cific strings attached. Similarly the low offers 
and high rejection rates of the Hadza appear to 
reflect their reluctant process of sharing (termed 
"tolerated theft" by a leading ethnographer of 
the Hadza). While the Hadza extensively share 
meat, many hunters look for opportunities to 
avoid sharing and share only because they fear 
the social consequences of not sharing, in the 
form of informal social sanctions, gossip, and 
ostracism. This behavior is apparently trans-
ferred to the experimental setting. 
Unlike the Hadza, the Ache did not reject low 
offers, and despite this the vast majority of the 
Ache (94 percent) made offers above 40 percent 
of the stake size. This coincides neatly with 
ethnographic descriptions indicating widespread 
meat-sharing and cooperation in community 
projects despite the absence of a fear of punish-
ment in Ache society. Ache hunters, returning 
home, quietly leave their kill at the edge of 
camp, often claiming that the hunt was fruitless; 
their catch is later discovered and collected by 
others and then meticulously shared among all 
in the camp. We think it likely that the stake in 
the game seemed to some of the Ache subjects 
as analogous to their catch. 
The Machiguenga show the lowest coopera-
tion rates in public-good games, reflecting eth-
nographic descriptions of Machiguenga life, 
which report little cooperation, exchange, or 
sharing beyond the family unit. By contrast, 
Orma experimental subjects quickly dubbed the 
public-goods experiment a harambee game, re-
ferring to the widespread institution of village-
level voluntary contributions for public-goods 
projects such as schools or roads. Not surpris-
ingly, they contributed generously (58 percent 
of the stake), somewhat higher than most U.S. 
subjects contribute in similar experiments. 
Ill. Discussion 
Our data indicate that the degree of cooper-
ation, sharing, and punishment exhibited by 
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experimental subjects closely corresponds to 
templates for these behaviors in the subjects' 
daily lives, and that the substantial variability in 
experimental behaviors across groups is an ex-
pression of the large between-group differences 
in the structures of social interaction and modes 
of livelihood. How do we interpret these results? 
Some of the variability among groups may be 
due to variations in implementation. We doubt 
that this explains the markedly differing behav-
iors across groups, however, since the experi-
ments were run from identical protocols across 
groups and were thus as similar in procedures 
and stake size as we could achieve. Where we 
could test for experimenter effects we found 
none. It is possible also that our subjects pre-
sumed that their actions would somehow be-
come public. In a good many of our cases, 
however, subsequent conversations with partic-
ipants convinced us that this was not the case. 
Finally, it could be that participants thought 
they were in a repeated interaction, even though 
the games we used were clearly one-shot. We 
do not find this interpretation compelling, how-
ever, since there is extensive evidence from 
experiments in advanced economies that sub-
jects understand the game very well, and those 
who reject a positive offer in the ultimatum 
game, when interviewed by the experimenter, 
typically do not say that they made an error, but 
rather affirm having goals besides maximizing a 
monetary payoff. 
Why are many subjects willing to share 
resources and undertake costly reciprocal ac-
tions in anonymous one-shot interactions? 
Bowles et al. (200 I) will provide a more 
extensive response than can be offered here. 
We suspect that a proximate reason for these 
behaviors is that situations cue emotional re-
sponses which induce the behaviors we have 
measured. For example, many ultimatum-
game responders from advanced societies, 
when facing a low offer, experience an emo-
tional impulse to hurt the proposer for being 
unfair, just as the subject might in a real-life 
bargaining situation. Similarly, the New Guinea 
responders who rejected hyper-fair offers in the 
UG may have experienced the same anxiety that 
emerges when somebody gives them an unsolic-
ited gift in everyday life. 
What are the ultimate determinants of our 
emotions and situation-specific cues? Here 
long-run evolutionary processes governing the 
distribution of genes and cultural practices 
could well have resulted in a substantial fraction 
of each population being predisposed in certain 
situations to forgo material payoffs in order to 
share with others, or to punish unfair actions, as 
our experimental subjects did. A number of 
recent contributions have shown that, under 
conditions that appear to approximate the social 
and physical environments of early human pop-
ulations, prosocial behavior can proliferate in a 
population in which it is initially rare (Bowles et 
aI., 2001). 
IV. Conclusion 
While our results do not imply that econo-
mists should abandon the rational-actor frame-
work, they do suggest two major revisions. 
First, the canonical model of the self-interested 
material payoff-maximizing actor is systemati-
cally violated. In all societies studied, UG offers 
are strictly positive and often substantially in 
excess of the expected income-maximizing of-
fer, as are contributions in the public-goods 
game, while rejections of positive offers in 
some societies occur at a considerable rate. Sec-
ond, preferences over economic choices are not 
exogenous as the canonical model would have 
it, but rather are shaped by the economic and 
social interactions of everyday life. This result 
implies that judgments in welfare economics 
that assume exogenous preferences are ques-
tionable, as are predictions of the effects of 
changing economic policies and institutions that 
fail to take account of behavioral change. Fi-
nally, the connection between experimental be-
havior and the structure of everyday economic 
life should provide an important clue in revising 
the canonical model of individual choice 
behavior. 
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